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Inclusive and Exclusive Concerns of 
National Identity as Determinants of  
French Citizens’ Attitudes Towards EU 
Integration
Amanda Knorr
INTRODUCTION
When discussing one’s attitude towards EU integration, the case study of France has 
become a very significant country to evaluate. One needs to care about this case so that it 
allows for a better understanding of support for the European Union. France is a special case 
as one has seen with all of the certain protests and referendums in the past. Especially with 
regards to this country, the public opinion concerning integration is very important. It is 
obvious due to numerous case studies and national surveys that national identity is very es-
sential, which is why I believe it is crucial to look deeper into this aspect of society. 
Regarding national identity in France, one needs to find the exclusive and inclusive di-
vide when discussing why one feels the way he does about European integration. Through-
out Europe in general, the concept of integration has been highly debated. The current 
literature includes numerous reasons regarding one’s incentives for why one feels the way he 
does regarding his attitude for the European Union. Some believe there are many reasons for 
peoples’ attitudes while others believe their actions stem from only one source. Concerning 
these theories, I believe one’s ideations of identity can be categorized into two separate con-
cerns—inclusive and exclusive. Inclusive concerns are associated with an individual’s pride 
for his identity; exclusive concerns are related to outside factors, which affect one’s attitude 
such as immigration and economic concerns. I believe if a separation between these factors 
can be created, it will facilitate the reasons for why the public supports or rejects EU integra-
tion, which will provide for a better understanding of the EU and its citizens.
Concerning inclusive concerns, such as one’s pride, the way one defines pride may af-
fect one’s attitude towards the European Union. There are numerous ways on how people 
can feel proud; I believe the concept is subjective unless previously defined. This holds true 
especially for the case study of France due to all of their different forms of patriotism and 
how they use these forms to further affect their opinions on other issues. For instance, in 
March 2006, President Chirac walked out of a summit because the language being used was 
English; the justifications for his actions were linguistic and economic patriotism (Mardell, 
2006). The article further discusses how these forms of patriotism are typical of French gov-
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ernment policy. Situations like these are what interested me in the topic of national identity. 
Are the French’s patriotic views genuine or are they used as excuses for why they oppose or 
support certain issues? Furthermore, does pride need to be considered when evaluating one’s 
national identity relating to their attitudes towards European integration? These are some of 
the questions I will attempt to address in my study of France.
On the other hand, exclusivist national identity concerns are infamous for playing a 
role in one’s attitudes for or against the European Union. These concerns have become in-
creasingly important in France due to issues of economics and especially immigration. 
As recently as last November, the government of the conservative president Nico-
las Sarkozy launched the “great debate on the national identity,” which critics 
have accused of fostering fear of French citizens with foreign roots and immi-
grants. The initiative intends to be a national consultation on defining the French 
identity through local meetings and a website where people can express their 
opinions. Although the government views this debate positively, national polls 
recorded that 50% of French citizens are dissatisfied with the way this debate is 
proceeding in France (Vision Critical, 2010). 
This high percentage of dissatisfaction demonstrates the need for further evaluation of 
French citizens’ exclusivist concerns. If one can find that there is a correlation between an 
individual’s exclusivist national identity and support for EU integration, it can help address 
reasons why so many citizens oppose this debate. Furthermore, if a correlation is found, these 
findings will better aide in a search for why one supports or opposes the European Union. 
With regards to exclusivist ideals, economic concerns are imperative to address. In the 
past, economics have been considered the reason for certain citizen’s attitudes for or against 
European Union integration. These concerns are regarded as external factors that influence 
the public’s decision. Within economics, there are two categories that I will discuss—socio-
tropic and pocketbook concerns. Sociotropic concerns are associated with the idea that one 
considers economics collectively; for instance, a person would consider the overall economic 
approval of France. On the other hand, pocketbook concerns deal with how an individual 
evaluates his economic approval without taking into consideration other’s situations. If any 
correlation is found between one’s economic concerns and one’s attitude towards the EU, 
it can help theorists to further understand why citizens feel certain ways. If these questions 
can be further addressed, it can help further European integration because the EU would be 
better able to appeal to certain citizens’ interests.
As previously stated, a factor that one needs to consider when discussing EU inte-
gration is economic concerns. This part of society plays a very large role when discussing 
whether citizens are for or against integration. Brinegar and Jolly (2005) demonstrate very 
interesting points in their article, Support for European Integration: Location, Location, Location. 
They find that low-skilled workers in economies with a lot of low-skilled labor are likely to 
welcome European integration, whereas low-skilled citizens in countries with a scarcity of 
low-skilled labor are likely to have a more negative evaluation of the EU (Brinegar & Jolly, 
2005). This makes sense because EU integration with enlargement would only increase the 
competition for jobs in that field by simply the increase in population—more people com-
peting for the same jobs. That is why it is easier to be against integration to protect one’s job 
market, thus having an exclusivist position. On the other hand, though there are exceptions, 
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professionals and executives are more likely to support European integration than manual 
laborers (Brinegar & Jolly, 2005). These findings correspond with the previous statement. As 
EU enlargement and integration continues, it seems to be a trend that there are more im-
migrants needing manual jobs than professional ones, which is why the executives would be 
in favor of this concept because it doesn’t affect them.
Gabel (1998) does a fine job complementing Brinegar and Jolly’s article in his book, 
Interests and Integration Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union. He further 
emphasizes how for unskilled workers, market liberalization creates competitiveness on wag-
es while skilled workers with relatively high levels of human capital derive greater benefits 
from integration than those with relatively low levels of human capital (Gabel, 1998). This is 
a crucial point when discussing European integration; integration leads to market liberaliza-
tion, which feeds competiveness for the unskilled workers of the country. He also argues that 
the benefits of trade liberalization increase with the dependence of the national economy 
on exports and imports from the EU market (Gabel, 1998). Therefore, the country has to 
give up some of its national economy to gain from the collective good, the European Union. 
This statement further proves why economic concerns are essential when discussing national 
identity and further EU integration.
However, in a very shocking article by Gross (1999), Three Million Foreigners, Three Mil-
lion Unemployed? Immigration and the French Labor Market, she found that immigration flows 
couldn’t be held responsible for the substantial increase in unemployment in France. Though 
there are certain factors that increase unemployment temporarily, the long-term effects were 
not disrupted. Gross (1999) states:
Low-skilled workers are beneficial to the French labor market. Their positive 
influence is also confirmed by the direct importance of a balanced distribution of 
regions of origin for unemployment. A rising flow of immigrant workers increas-
es the aggregate wage, which feeds into unemployment, leading to a temporary 
increase in unemployment (p. 23). 
Although Gross’s study finds that the effects of immigration on the French labor market are 
very small, temporary, and not specific to the foreign labor force, it is necessary to pay extra 
attention to the temporary causes. A significant issue with EU integration is that many citi-
zens do not realize that these situations are only temporary, which leads to their exclusivist 
reasons to oppose EU integration.
Another exclusivist ideal that complements economic concerns is the threat of im-
migration. With regards to the current times, it is essential to consider immigration when 
discussing the reasons why people support or oppose European Union integration. Further-
more, due to the recent problems France has experienced with immigrants, it is even more 
significant to consider immigration with the case study that I have chosen. The presence of 
immigrants can evidentially influence one’s attitude towards integration due to one’s per-
sonal experiences regarding his interactions with the new civilians. Also, it is important to 
address how the presence of immigrants can give more attention to the inside versus outside 
paradigm.
In the book Immigration, ‘race’ and ethnicity in contemporary France, by Alec G. Hargreaves 
(1995), he argues how there are no “races” in France amongst whom “relations” can be 
said to exist. He continues to talk about how there is confusion between the definitions of 
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an immigrant and a foreigner. Also, it is addressed how immigrant-born youths should be 
considered equal when being compared to their French peers due to the education system. 
Silverman (1992) continues to say in his book, Deconstructing the nation: immigration, racism, and 
citizenship in modern France, how 80% of those popularly classified as immigrants have been in 
France for more than ten years. He further addresses how the major classification of people 
in France is in terms of nationality: you are either a national or a foreigner (Silverman, 1992). 
This is the issue that I firmly think is problematic when discussing European integration, 
especially when regarding the case study of France.
The last concern that needs to be addressed concerning exclusivist ideals is the idea 
of national identity. It is essential to concentrate on the difference between exclusive and 
inclusive identity because identity cannot be generalized—the different identities are as-
sociated with different motives. If these motives are found to be correlated with support or 
opposition towards EU integration, they will serve as a technique to further help one under-
stand why citizens possess certain attitudes. Once these reasons are found to be significant, 
problem solving can commence to close the distance gap between the European Union and 
its citizens.
Cederman (2001) discusses his view in the article, Nationalism and Bounded Integration: 
What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos: 
There are different views such as the essentialist approach (each ethnic core pro-
duces a political identity more or less straightforwardly) and the constructivism 
approach (the unmitigated link between cultural raw material and political identi-
ties is broken by an active process of identity-formation entailing manipulation of 
cultural symbols) when evaluating integration. Furthermore, there is a difference 
between supersession (the nation-state is superseded as soon as a supra-national 
system of symbols is established and is adhered to by the masses) and retention (of 
national identity to denote assumptions that stress the staying power of actually 
existing nation-states together with their supporting principle, nationalism) when 
demonstrating ways to evaluate the nation-state compared to the supra-national 
system (p.142-144). 
He argues that bounded-integration is the most convincing through the associative, elec-
toral, and civic channels. When bounded integrationists want autonomy protection it simply 
means that the integration process must be slowed down in order for identity-formation 
to catch up (Cederman, 2001). He addresses national identity as a factor that needs to be 
considered when discussing EU integration, but further evaluates how one should utilize 
this concept.
Moreover, Adebahr (2009) in Think National Interest, Act European believes that integra-
tion is the only way forward for the EU. He believes that specific global challenges such as 
the economic crisis and climate change have become the driving forces of European integra-
tion. He states, “It is no longer the possibility of integration based on its inherent advantages 
that are in the foreground, but rather the necessity of defending ourselves against increasing 
dangers (Adebahr, 2009).” Therefore, this is a different way to look at integration; by inte-
grating the EU, the EU as a whole can be protected from others—such as other countries 
outside of Europe. This is not a view of the EU being exclusivist among each other, but join-
ing together to be exclusivist to other countries outside of its borders. This approach to EU 
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integration could raise many questions concerning one’s national identity, which requires 
further research.
When discussing European integration, it is essential to discuss Hooghe’s stance on 
the issue. In Hooghe’s (2003) article, Europe Divided? Elites vs. Public Opinion on European 
Integration, she discusses the difference between the functional model and the social model. 
The functional model argues that elites and citizens desire Europeanization if and when it is 
functional, while the social model says that since there might be some risk involved in keep-
ing certain issues at the national level, citizens may want to selectively shift some policies to 
the European level (Hooghe, 2003). Within her study, she compares the opinions of others in 
certain areas such as high politics issues, social model policies, and redistribution. Her study 
finds that there is a divide between elite support for integration and public opinion; elites 
tend to embody the functional model while citizens tend to embody the social model.
With regards to the previous concepts stated, inclusive concerns (pride) and exclusive 
concerns (immigration and economic reasons), these issues can help the European Union 
with addressing integration to its citizens through the inside versus outside paradigm. This 
is specifically important with the country of France due to its stereotypical attitudes that its 
citizens are known for—nationalistic attitudes. These attitudes are associated with French 
citizens’ civic identity. By addressing the difference between inclusive and exclusive ide-
als concerning one’s national identity, it will further provide more solutions for citizens’ 
attitudes and help to narrow the gap between the European Union and its citizens when 
discussing EU integration.
THEORY
The relationship between France and national identity is a very important issue to 
address concerning European integration. Especially regarding France, the concept of civic 
identity is extremely significant when discussing citizens’ stance on national identity. This is 
evident as seen with the protests and referendums; public opinion on integration is very vital 
to this country. It is not clear what aspects of national identity contribute to attitudes toward 
EU integration. This is why one needs to take a deeper look into the concept of identity.
French citizens have always possessed an attachment to their country. Whether it is 
concerning one’s pride or one’s idea of protection, they have always been known for their 
nationalistic traits. The necessary question to address is why these citizens possess this idea of 
national identity. I think one needs to evaluate the situation deeper by looking at the differ-
ences between exclusive and inclusive identity. This would allow for a better understanding 
of EU support. Concerning identity, is it a correlation with pride or an exclusivist outcome? 
France is a different case with these two concepts. Pride may not predict low support; it may 
be exclusivist intentions. Although this may be the case, I believe a French citizen doesn’t 
need to have an exclusivist identity; this is why the French should not necessarily possess 
anti-European Union ideals. Discussing the reasons why I think that it is important to evalu-
ate one’s national identity led me to my research question and hypotheses. In France, does 
national identity affect one’s opinion on EU integration? If so, what is the role of exclusive 
and inclusive positions of national identity?
H1: High levels of exclusivist national identity will relate to low levels of support 
for EU integration.
H2: There will be no relationship between national pride and European Union 
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support. 
H3: High levels of economic support will equal low levels of EU support.
METHOD
A snowball sample of 116 French citizens was used. People were contacted in Novem-
ber 2010 through email using the online survey tool, Qualtrics, and invited to participate in 
the questionnaire that took about 10 minutes.
The steps taken to complete the survey were the following: First, numerous pieces of 
literature were read concerning the main variables. The variables were determined as: the 
dependent variable being support for European Union integration, while the independent 
variable was national identity—exclusive (immigration and economic concerns) and in-
clusive (pride). Further literature was studied with regards to the United States’ national 
identity concerning African Americans. A parallel was found with the research of America 
to the research of Europe. After the literature was read, the survey was produced concerning 
questions that were deemed necessary to address. Some of the questions were adopted from 
Professor Basak Ural’s survey regarding the case study of Germany. Further questions were 
created that appealed specifically to the French citizens’ interests. Once all the questions were 
formed, they were categorized into sections that corresponded with the variables previously 
stated. Furthermore, decisions were made whether the questions were considered inclusive 
or exclusive concerns, which would help once the data was collected.
An introductory page was added to explain how the participants would be kept anony-
mous and an email address was provided if they had any further questions. The entire survey 
was then translated into French and proofread by Professor Brett Wells, Program Chair-
man of the French Department at the University of Pittsburgh. The survey was distributed 
through a link provided by Qualtrics and sent out by email to numerous French citizens: 
host families, academic advisors, personal friends, hotel owners, restaurant staff, Honorary 
French Consuls throughout states in America, and the University of Pittsburgh’s French De-
partment. The participants were given two weeks to complete the survey and the data was 
collected through Qualtrics.
Once all the data was collected, it was imported into Excel and each participant’s re-
sponse was coded. The data was then categorized by questions, which were determined by 
the variables. Scales were created for each category and certain questions were reversed if 
needed to follow the same scale as the rest of the questions. The scales were then used to find 
correlations through Excel with each variable. Correlations were found using the dependent 
variable (EU Support for Integration) and different independent variables (exclusive ideals, 
inclusive ideals, economic concerns, and immigration) for each correlation. To specify cer-
tain questions, cross tabulations were conducted using Qualtrics to see if they could better 
provide results regarding certain questions. The following are the questions that were con-
sidered for each scale (See Appendix A).
1. EU Support for Integration—8, 9, 10, 11
2. National Identity—Exclusive Ideals—Economic Concerns—30, 31, 32, 33
3. National Identity—Exclusive Ideals—Immigration—19, 20, 24, 25 
4. National Identity—Exclusive Ideals—14, 15, 22, 23
5. National Identity—Inclusive Ideals—Pride—13, 16, 17, 18 
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The sex of the participants was 33.7% males and 66.3% females; the females were 
overrepresented with regards to France. The age of the participants ranged from 17 to 73 
years (M=44.8 years, Standard Deviation=15.14). Concerning education, an overwhelming 
majority of the participants completed the BAC. More specifically, the percentages were as 
followed for the highest level of education: BAC (11%), BAC +1, 2, 3 (41%), BAC +4, 5, 6 
(37%), BAC +7, 8, 9, 10 (7%), and other (4%). The average monthly net household income 
ranged from less than 300 Euros to more than 5,000 Euros (M=7.18, 7=2,000-3,000 Euros 
on the scale, with a Standard Deviation= 2.40). Concerning one’s civil status: 29% were 
single, 52% were married, 7% were living together, and 12% did not respond. With regards 
to the number of children: 38% had zero children, 5%, had one child, 8% had two, 20% had 
three, 19% had four, 9% had five, and 1% had six children. The participants’ level of work 
varied by: 16% were students, 19% were retired, 51% were employed, and 16% were unem-
ployed. The majority of French citizens lived in France (93%) while 4% lived in the United 
States, and 3% lived elsewhere. More specifically, 55% of the participants lived in Nantes, 9% 
lived in Paris, 3% lived in Marseilles, and 3% lived in Pittsburgh. The rest of the participants 
lived all over France and cities such as: Madrid, England, and Sydney. 
MATERIAL
Participants completed a questionnaire on: (a) general interests in politics (5 items), 
(b) knowledge of political institutions (2 items), (c) national identity concerning exclusiv-
ist ideals (7 items), (d) national identity concerning inclusive ideals (7 items), (e) stance on 
immigration (7 items), (f) stance on power with nation state or EU (4 items), (g) economic 
concerns (4 items), and (h) demographics (9 items). Questions were presented as Likert-type 
or bipolar scales with three to eleven responses. The scales of measurement were mostly ad-
opted from Professor Basak Ural’s study. Due to some of her questions regarding only Ger-
many, other items were added concerning French ideals to receive more specific results. The 
complete questionnaire with average answers and standard deviations is given in Appendix A.
RESULTS
Before stating the results for each hypothesis, it is necessary to focus on the general 
findings for France with regards to the survey so that one can have a better understanding of 
the case study before the specific results are addressed. For instance, regarding the left/right 
political spectrum, the M=4.47 and SD=1.45 with the scale being 1=very left and 7=very 
right, showing that the participants were further right than left, which is typical for France 
when comparing it to other countries. Moreover, there was a general shift to the right with 
elections concerning how citizens will vote for the next elections. The mean shifted by .15 
to the right with regards to the political parties they would vote for next time. There was 
even an increase of 5 citizens who would vote for the Front National, which is the most 
extreme right political party in France. Concerning one’s knowledge, the mean increased 
by 1.47 on a scale of 1-10 (1=knowing nothing and 10=knowing the most), regarding how 
much French citizens think they know about France’s government compared to the Euro-
pean Union. This was also a typical assumption by nation state’s knowing more about their 
government than that of the European Union.
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H1: High levels of exclusivist national identity will relate to low levels of support for EU 
integration.
In other words, as exclusivist national identity increases, support for EU integration will 
decrease. In general, 68% said France joining the EU was a good thing but only 53% thought 
that France benefitted from the EU. Also, when asking the question, “In the future, do you 
see yourself as…,” 72% said that they are French first and European second. Most impor-
tantly, it was found that as disapproval for the EU increases, exclusivist ideals increase, r=.50. 
This is a very strong correlation, which supports hypothesis 1. This correlation demonstrates 
how exclusivist concerns affect one’s attitude towards EU integration. Due to these findings 
concerning national identity and support for EU integration, it is necessary to take a deeper 
look to find out the reasons why the citizens felt this way regarding the previous findings.
The first aspect of exclusive identity that needs to be addressed is the concern for im-
migration and how certain concerns affect one’s attitude towards EU integration. This is 
an essential concept to evaluate because 99% of the participants believe immigration is a 
current, important question in France. When asking the question, “Think of the immigrants 
currently living in France. What is the percentage you believe they are willing to assimilate 
into French society?” the M=5.81 (0%=1 and 100%=11) and the SD=2.28. The average that 
French citizens believe immigrants will assimilate is only 48% into French life. Furthermore, 
the majority of respondents believe immigrants will only assimilate 30%. With regards to the 
average of citizens believing immigrant assimilation is less than 50%, this idea can potentially 
serve as a reason why exclusivist ideals coincide with one’s attitude involving EU integration. 
French citizens could oppose EU integration because they believe immigrants will not fully 
assimilate into their culture.
This point is further emphasized when discussing the correlations found between sup-
port for the EU and immigration. It was found that as disapproval for the EU increases, dis-
approval for immigration increases, r=.45. This is considered a quite strong correlation and 
can show the relationship between the two variables. This correlation supports hypothesis 
1 because immigration is an example of an exclusive concern. Therefore, immigration may 
serve as a reason why one supports or opposes EU integration.
Furthermore, it is crucial to differentiate between French citizens’ attitudes regarding 
immigration between EU and non-EU countries. Concerning the questions in the survey, 
the participants were more in favor for EU immigration than non-EU immigration. With 
the scale being 1=very favorable and 5=not favorable, the M=3.27 and SD=1.07 for non-
EU, and M=2.56 and SD=.89 for EU countries; there is a .71 increase of the mean towards 
being against immigration when discussing non-EU countries compared to EU countries. 
To facilitate the understanding of these results, reference the cross tabulations: Integration 
Scale/Non-EU Immigration and Integration Scale/EU Immigration (See Appendix B).
Concerning these tables, one can see that as support for EU integration increases, 
support for immigration increases in general. With regards to non-EU countries, there is a 
decrease with support, which explains France’s attitudes towards non-EU immigration. For 
instance, there was a general shift towards being against non-EU immigration with regards to 
people who were for integration. This provides a more detailed explanation regarding French 
citizens’ reasons for opposing EU integration with the exclusivist concepts of immigration. 
These findings show that by holding attitudes of EU integration constant, citizens are more 
willing to support immigration if the immigrants are already in the European Union. 
With reference to the Hooghe questions that were asked in the survey concerning the 
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distribution of power between the nation-state and EU (1= national only/5= EU only), the 
findings were very neutral regarding the citizens viewing the EU exclusively. In the survey, 
one concept was adopted from each of her areas: high politic issues (currency), social model 
policies (environment), and redistribution (agriculture). With regards to the scale, M=3.3 and 
SD=.88 for currency, M=3.23 and SD=.88 for environment, and M=2.8 and SD=1.01 for 
agriculture. Agriculture is the only area where the mean leans slightly more towards France’s 
power, which makes sense concerning the history of France and its agriculture; they would 
like their nation-state to have a little more control than the supranational organization. Due 
to the other two issues being generally neutral or even slightly towards EU power only, it is 
important to address that power over these areas does not greatly influence one’s reasons why 
they support or oppose EU integration.
H2: There will be no relationship between national pride and European Union support. 
Through the results of the study, this hypothesis is proven to be inaccurate. The correla-
tion found was that as disapproval for the EU increases, one’s pride increases, r=.427. There-
fore, citizen’s inclusive concerns (such as pride) need to be taken into consideration when 
discussing the reasons for one’s attitude towards EU integration. Even though this is shown 
through the correlation, it is important to address this relationship but state that exclusive 
concerns are still stronger when evaluating citizens’ attitudes (remembering that r=.50 when 
discussing the correlation between exclusive ideals and support for the EU). In general, 74% 
considered them proud to be French, while 26% either did not care or were not proud to 
be a French citizen. When considering the case study of France, this is an interesting find 
because past literature has shown that it is typical for an overwhelming majority of French 
citizens to be proud of their country. It was shocking to find that over ¼ of the citizens did 
not hold this assumption true.
Furthermore, when discussing specific questions regarding one’s pride, it is interest-
ing to note how one’s attitude towards pride differs concerning what aspect of the concept 
is being asked. Questions 16, 17, and 18 were evaluated on a scale of 5 (See Appendix A). 
When discussing the heritage of France, results showed that M=4.8 and SD=.53, which 
demonstrates a really strong agreement with the affirmation. Therefore, the French believe 
they have a very strong history. When discussing French attributes, M=3.96 and SD=1.05, 
the average also strongly agrees that they possess certain characteristics that others do not. 
By believing they possess these attributes, the French are simply more proud to be French. 
Lastly, M=3.17 and SD=1.20 for France’s national anthem; this shows that the French were 
quite indifferent with regards to their pride being correlated when hearing the anthem. By 
discussing the means of these specific questions show how the French differentiate when 
discussing what aspects of France make them proud, which could serve as a potential prob-
lem when correlating support for EU integration with France’s inclusive concerns (pride).
With regards to this potential problem, it is necessary to take a deeper look into cer-
tain scales of integration concerning different pride statements used in the survey. The cross 
tabulations will help to clarify how strongly pride actually has an effect on one’s attitude 
towards EU integration. Reference the following cross tabulations: For/against integration: 
Pride Statement, Scale of integration/Proud Statement, Identity/ Integration Scale (See Ap-
pendix B).
It is important to address that although r=.42 regarding pride and support for EU inte-
gration, there are specific instances where pride shows no significant relation with how one 
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feels about integration. For example, looking at the cross tabulation (For/against Integration: 
Pride Scale), 67/108 citizens who said they were proud also said they were for integration. 
Also, all the people who said they were “neither” concerning pride was still for EU integra-
tion, 22/108. Furthermore, the only people who said they were only a little proud or not 
proud at all were still for integration 5/108. Although there is a correlation between pride 
and EU support, this example shows that pride did not greatly factor into one’s decision on 
EU integration due to how widely the results for pride varied yet support for EU integra-
tion was constant.
When referencing the cross tabulation (Scale of Integration/Proud Statement), it is 
interesting to note that 92/108 citizens that entirely agree with their proud history vary on 
their views of EU integration with a M=5.67. Although there is a strong correlation that 
I cannot dismiss, while pride was constant, one’s attitude towards EU integration varied, 
which shows that pride did not factor into this situation. Lastly, when looking at the cross 
tabulation (Identity/Integration Scale), the majority of citizens who said they were French 
first then European were still for integration, 68/108 citizens. Therefore, in this situation, the 
pride of being French did not make one oppose integration. It needs to be addressed that 
this identity questioned was also discussed in the exclusive national identity section but was 
not involved in any correlations due to the question applying to both inclusive and exclusive 
ideals.
H3: High levels of economic support will equal low levels of EU support.
In other words, as economic approval increases, EU support for integration decreases. 
The correlation found that as disapproval for EU increases, economic disapproval increases, 
r=.05. Though this is considered a correlation, it is a very weak relationship. Also, this cor-
relation finds my hypothesis to be inaccurate because as economic disapproval increases, 
approval for the EU should have increased, not decreased. Due to the small correlation of 
opposite findings, it is necessary to see if there is a difference when correlating sociotropic 
and pocketbook concerns with support for EU integration. General findings showed that 
48% less citizens said their personal economics were bad compared to France’s overall eco-
nomics. No one believed that France’s economics were considered very good. Also, there 
was a 13% increase when saying France’s economic situation will get worse compared to 
one’s individual situation (both of these findings can be shown in the first two cross tabula-
tions). Though the correlations did not support a clearer explanation (sociotropic concerns, 
r=.04 and pocketbook concerns, r=.06), they showed how it was necessary to conduct cross 
tabulations for further explanations of the overall small correlation. Reference the following 
cross tabulations: France’s Pocketbook Concerns, France’s Sociotropic Concerns, Pocket-
book Concerns/Integration, Sociotropic Concerns/Integration (See Appendix B).
Concerning France’s pocketbook and integration cross tabulation, for the majority, 
high and low levels of economic concern led to high EU support for integration. On the 
other hand, France’s sociotropic and integration cross tabulation shows that low levels of 
economic support led to high levels of EU support for integration. Therefore, with regards 
to sociotropic concerns, hypothesis 3 is considered correct. Due to these cross tabulations, 
they provide a potential explanation that the difference between pocketbook and sociotropic 
concerns could explain the low and opposite findings for the correlation.
It is also important to note that the previous findings were retrospective. Therefore, it 
is necessary to see if one’s prospective views of pocketbook and sociotropic concerns show 
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any difference to one’s attitude towards EU integration. Reference the following cross tabu-
lations for a further explanation: Pocketbook/Integration—Prospective and Sociotropic/
Integration—Prospective (See Appendix B).
With regards to the prospective cross tabulations, citizens who were for integration 
showed a shift towards the idea that France will do worse in a year than citizen’s individual 
situations. These results coincide with the general findings previously stated. I believe it is 
necessary to address that as the research progressed, pocketbook concerns served as only a 
comparison to show the sociotropic concerns in relative terms. When comparing the pro-
spective cross tabulations with the retrospective ones, the prospective tables can further help 
with hypothesis 3 concerning sociotropic concerns. The shift showing how citizens think 
France will do worse demonstrates that low levels of economic approval equal high levels 
of EU support. This finding complements the retrospective, sociotropic results very well. By 
showing that the retrospective and prospective results concerning sociotropic concerns show 
the same findings, demonstrates how the time of economics do not factor into one’s attitudes 
towards EU integration. 
DISCUSSION
Though the results of my survey did not necessarily support each one of the hypothe-
ses, it provided for a better understanding of French citizens regarding their attitudes towards 
EU integration. Also, it allowed for new findings to be discussed without initially contem-
plating them prior to the survey. Furthermore, the research offered a better explanation of 
the previous authors’ stances on the issue of EU integration. Through the results, citizens’ 
incentives to support or oppose the European Union have been clarified through inclusive 
and exclusive concerns of national identity.
With regards to hypothesis 1, the correlation showed that as disapproval for the EU 
increases, exclusivist ideals increase, r=.50. Moreover, as disapproval for EU increases, disap-
proval for immigration increases, r=.45. When specifically looking at two survey items, the 
shift for not being in favor of immigration when it is with a non-EU country shows how 
citizens are more willing to support immigration if immigrants are already in the EU—these 
results consisted of people who initially stated that they supported integration. This exem-
plifies that it needs to be taken into consideration what country the immigrants are com-
ing from when discussing immigration and integration. To further establish this point, one 
respondent emailed me to ask for clarification concerning the countries being considered. 
He stated that if the survey was considering Turkey, his results would have been different. 
The empirical evidence and correlations suggest that exclusivist concerns and immigration 
matter, and they should be taken into consideration when discussing countries outside of 
the EU.
Other findings that I deem significant to address are the results concerning Hooghe’s 
(2003) stances on the divide of power between the nation-state and the EU. As previously 
stated, due to Hooghe’s questions in the survey mostly being neutral or slightly towards EU 
power, (with the exception of agriculture) demonstrate that power does not significantly 
factor into one’s reasons for why he supports or opposes the EU. This is interesting when 
discussing France due to numerous authors’ literature stating how France would oppose the 
EU due to losing power to the supranational organization.
After evaluating my results, certain issues arose with how I could have constructed my 
survey differently or what I will add to continue my research in the future. Regarding the 
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French citizen who established his concern for countries like Turkey, I believe there needs to 
be more research regarding certain countries of debate to see if they have a stronger correla-
tion than immigration in general. Therefore, more questions need to be asked about different 
non-EU countries. Although the correlation between exclusivist concerns and support for 
EU integration was strong, it was difficult to find a cross tabulation that showed a strong 
relationship between an exclusive and integration question. In the future, it would be helpful 
to ask more exclusive questions to have a larger option to choose from. Most importantly, it 
is necessary to address that the results of this survey may be skewed due to the participants 
knowing that they were completing it for an American citizen.
Due to both of the correlations being strong with this hypothesis, it shows that exclu-
sive concerns are significant. With regards to these results, if more research was conducted 
concerning Cederman’s (2001) bounded integrationist concept, this idea could be dem-
onstrated as a possible solution for why people oppose EU integration. Since the research 
shows that exclusive national identity is important and the concept is about slowing down 
the integration process so national identity can catch up, bounded integration could provide 
a rational compromise for exclusive concerns and EU integration. Furthermore, Silverman’s 
(1992) idea of being either a national or a foreigner is further demonstrated in the cross tabu-
lation of EU and non-EU countries concerning immigration. The more one is considered a 
foreigner, the less likely French citizens are willing to permit immigration. Further research 
would allow for more detailed findings of the previous statements.
When discussing hypothesis 2, the correlation found that as disapproval for the EU in-
crease, one’s pride increases, r=.427. Although this is considered a strong correlation, the spe-
cific questions in the survey demonstrated how people’s pride changed due to the different 
questions being asked. The three cross tabulations in this section revealed the inconsistency 
of how one perceives the concept of pride. For instance, the first cross tabulation showed 
how pride varied when support for integration was constant, while the second one showed 
how one’s opinion on integration varied when pride was constant. These findings can show 
how even though the correlation was considered strong, the concept of pride varied due to 
how the citizen defined pride.
Even though this hypothesis was shown to be inaccurate, many findings show that pride 
is a difficult concept to evaluate. Since pride is considered subjective, in future surveys, the 
definition of pride needs to be established before the participants can answer the questions. 
In addition, it would be helpful to differentiate the inclusive concerns regarding nationalism 
and patriotism. The examples of specific questions, descriptive analysis and cross tabulations, 
show how pride can vary depending on the participant. Pride was found to be a “case-by-
case” concept so that the meaning is different for different people. With subjectivity aside, it 
was shown that pride does factor into one’s attitude towards the EU due to the correlation. 
This finding could be considered a potential reason why President Chirac walked out of the 
summit; he was simply too proud of his language to even consider listening to a different one. 
Lastly, the correlation found regarding hypothesis 3 states that as disapproval for the EU 
increases, economic disapproval increases, r=.05. Regarding the retrospective cross tabula-
tions, the pocketbook table showed that high and low levels of economic concern led to 
high levels of EU support, while the sociotropic table showed that low levels of economic 
support led to high levels of EU support. On the other hand, regarding the prospective cross 
tabulations, the sociotropic table demonstrated how there was a shift towards thinking that 
France will do worse in a year than one’s individual situation. This finding complements the 
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retrospective cross tabulation concerning France’s sociotropic concerns. While they comple-
ment one another, it also expresses that it does not matter when one views the economics 
because both cross tabulations concerning the sociotropic concerns support hypothesis 3.
In relation to the findings stated above, there is a difference with one’s view on pock-
etbook and sociotropic concerns; this needs to be considered for the explanation of the low, 
opposite correlation. To prove this finding conclusively, one would need to ask more ques-
tions differentiating between pocketbook and sociotropic economic concerns. Furthermore, 
asking more questions could be a method to find a stronger correlation since the correlation 
was only based on four questions concerning economics in the survey. One possible expla-
nation for why the correlation was found to be small and opposite of the hypothesis is the 
explanation of French citizens’ view on immigrants and the economy. Gross (1999) states 
that there is a temporary increase in unemployment because of immigrants. This statement 
complements my correlation very well; as disapproval for the EU increases (with regards to 
immigrants), economic disapproval increases (concerning the temporary unemployment). 
This is a potential explanation that requires further research for future studies.
Throughout all of the results found through correlations and cross tabulations with 
regards to the study, one’s national identity does have an effect on one’s attitude towards EU 
integration. Considering the research that was conducted, a possible solution could be that 
a combination of inclusive and exclusive identity needs to be considered when discussing 
one’s motives for one’s attitudes. It is noted, however, with the correlations that exclusivist 
ideals play a larger role with regards to support towards the European Union. Furthermore, 
if people conduct a study that defines pride, I believe the correlation would be stronger with 
regards to how the inclusive identity affects an individual’s reasons for supporting or oppos-
ing the EU. Lastly, if one could further research the differences between pocketbook and 
sociotropic concerns, I think there would be a stronger correlation regarding disapproval for 
the EU and economic disapproval. With the exception of economics, it is shown throughout 
the study that exclusive concerns play a significant role concerning one’s attitudes towards 
EU integration, while pride is considered a close second. Through more surveys of public 
opinion, I believe it would be achievable to prove that exclusive and inclusive concerns of 
national identity complement one another when discussing one’s attitude towards European 
Union integration. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire
Questions Scale Mean SD
1. How interested are you in politics? 1=very interested
5=not interested
2.79 .85
2. How often do you find yourself discussing politics with 
your friends? 
1=never
5=very often
3.09 .76
3. Many people use terms as “left“ and “right“ to refer 
to different political attitudes. Here we have a measure 
that ranges from left to right. When you think about your 
own political attitudes, where would you place them on 
the following scale? 
1=very left
7=very right
4.47 1.45
4. If there were French elections next Sunday, which party 
would you vote for? 
1=most left party
6=most right party
4.39 1.14
5. Which party did you vote for in the last French elec-
tions? 
1=most left party
6=most right party
4.24 1.28
6. How much do you feel you know about the European 
Union, its policies, and its institutions?
1=knowing nothing
10=knowing a lot
5.02 2.25
7. How much do you feel you know about the French 
government?
1=knowing nothing
10=knowing a lot
6.49 2.08
8. Now thinking about the European Union, some say 
European integration should go further. Others say it has 
already gone too far. What number on the scale best de-
scribes your position?
1=integration has gone too far
10=integration should go further
5.67 2.49
9. In general, are you for or against efforts being made to 
integrate Europe? Are you ...? 
1=very for
4=very against
1.91 .59
10. Generally speaking, do you think that France’s mem-
bership of the European Union is ...? 
1=very good 
4=very bad
1.38 .63
11. Taking everything into consideration, would you say 
that France has on balance benefited or not from being a 
member of the European Union? 
1=really benefited
5=did not benefit
2.48 1.11
12. In the near future do you see yourself as...? 1= French only
4=European only
2.08 .53
13. How proud are you to be a French citizen? 1=very proud
5=not proud
2.13 .83
14. Are you willing to allow others not born in France 
to share your identity? (if they complete the legal regula-
tions)
1=very willing
5=very against
1.96 .90
15. How strongly do you agree with this statement? 
French should not buy foreign products because it hurts 
French business.
1=do not agree
5=entirely agree
2.55 1.03
16. How strongly do you agree with this statement? 
France has a strong historical heritage.
1=do not agree
5=entirely agree
4.80 .53
17. How strongly do you agree with this statement? 
French people possess certain cultural attributes that oth-
er people do not possess.
1=do not agree
5=entirely agree
3.96 1.05
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18. How strongly do you agree with this statement? 
When hearing the French anthem makes me feel good 
about being a French citizen.
1=do not agree
5=entirely agree
3.17 1.20
19. Do you think diversity is an important value in 
France?
1=very important
3=not important
1.73 .65
20. Do you think immigration is a significant issue cur-
rently in France? 
1=very important
3=not important
1.35 .50
21. Now think about the immigrants currently living in 
France. What percentage of them do you think are willing 
to integrate? (They are eager to adapt to living in France, 
learning the French language and culture.) 
1=0%
11=100%
5.81 2.28
22. Do you see EU integration as a cultural threat to your 
national identity?
1=large threat
5=no threat
3.71 1.10
23. What is your opinion regarding future EU enlarge-
ment?
1=very against
5=very for
2.50 1.08
24. What is your opinion regarding immigration to 
France from non-EU countries?
1=very favorable
5=not favorable
3.27 1.07
25. What is your opinion regarding immigration to 
France from EU countries?
1=very favorable
5=not favorable
2.56 .89
26. Hooghe discusses the European division between 
elites and public opinion within the EU. Do you believe 
there is a division?
1=yes
3=no
1.52 .57
27. How do you want to distribute authority concerning 
currency between the European Union and the French 
government?
1=nation only
5=EU only
3.30 .88
28. How do you want to distribute authority concern-
ing environment between the European Union and the 
French government?
1=nation only
5=EU only
3.23 .88
29. How do you want to distribute authority concerning 
agriculture between the European Union and the French 
government?
1=nation only
5=EU only
2.83 1.01
30. How would you generally rate the current economic 
situation in France? 
1=very good
5=very bad
3.70 .69
31. And your own current financial situation? 1=very good
5=very bad
2.77 .87
32. What do you think the economic situation in France 
will be like in one year?
1=considerably better than today
5=considerable worse than today
3.05 .66
33. And what will your own financial situation be like in 
one year from now?
1=considerably better than today
5=considerable worse than today
2.90 .61
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Appendix B: Cross Tabulations
Amanda Knorr University of Pittsburgh68
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2011/iss1/7
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 69
French Citizens’ Attitudes Towards EU Integration
Amanda Knorr University of Pittsburgh70
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2011/iss1/7
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 71
French Citizens’ Attitudes Towards EU Integration
REFERENCES
Adebahr, C. (2009, Summer). Think national interest, act European: A European “union 
state” is inevitable—if Europe’s nation states hope to survive. Internationale Politik 
(Global Edition).
Brinegar, A. P., & Jolly, S. K. (2005). Location, location, location: National contextual factors 
and public support for European integration. European Union Politics, 6(2), 155-180.
Cederman, L.E. (2001). Nationalism and bounded integration: What it would take to con-
struct a European demos. European Journal of International Relations, 7(2), 139-174.
Gabel, M. J. (1998) Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European 
Union. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Gross, D. M. (1999). Three Million Foreigners, Three Million Unemployed? Immigration and the 
French Labor Market. IMF Working Papers 99/124, International Monetary Fund.
Hargreaves, A. G. (1995). Immigration, ‘Race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France. London: 
Routledge.
Hooghe, L. (2003). Europe divided? : Elites vs. public opinion on European integration. Eu-
ropean Union Politics, 4(3), 281-304.
Mardell, M. (2006, March 24). French pride tested at EU summit. BBC News. Retrieved 
December 10, 2010 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4842734.stm
Silverman, M. (1992). Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modern 
France. London: Routledge
Vision Critical (2010, January 14). French Disappointed with National Identity Debate. Re-
trieved December 10, 2010 from http://www.angus reid.com/polls/38058/french_
disappointed_with_national_identity_debate/
Amanda Knorr University of Pittsburgh72
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2011/iss1/7
